University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Reviews

Faculty Scholarship

1999

Revaluing Restitution: From the Talmud to Postsocialism
Michael A. Heller

University of Michigan Law School, mhelle@law.columbia.edu

Christopher Serkin

Vanderbilt Law School, chris.serkin@vanderbilt.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/reviews/65

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/reviews
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, and the Religion Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Heller, Michael A., co-author. "Revaluing Restitution: From the Talmud to Postsocialism." C. Serkin, coauthor. Review of Unjust Enrichment: A Study of Private Law and Public Values, by H. Dagan. Mich. L. Rev.
97, no. 6 (1999): 1385-412.

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Reviews by an authorized administrator of
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

REVALUING RESTITUTION:
FROM THE TALMUD TO POSTSOCIALISM
Michael Heller* and ChristopherSerkin**
UNJUST ENRicHMENT:

A

STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW AND PUBLIC

VALUES. By Hanoch Dagan. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press. 1998. Pp. 185. $59.95.
TABLE OF CoNTErs
I.

II.

INTRODUCTION .....................................
RoADMAP To RESTITUTION ........................

A. The Argument in Brief ..........................
B. The Translation Scheme ........................
1. Definitions .................................
2. American Law Application ................
C. Restitution and National Ethos .................
III. PUTTING RESTITUTION TO T=E TEST ...............

1397

A. The Relationship Between Privatizationand
Restitution .....................................
B. The Variety of Restitution ......................
1. Restitution in the Czech Republic ..........
2. Restitution in Hungary .....................
C. Gaps in the Existing Literature.................
1. Why Restitute Property At All? ............
2. Why Natural Restitution? ..................
D. PostsocialistRestitution Through the Dagan
Prism ..........................................
1. Of Control and Well-Being .................
2. Eastern Europe and the "Personhood"of
Property ...................................
3. The Ethos of Expropriation................
IV.

CONCLUSION .......................................

I.

1385
1388
1388
1389
1389
1390
1393
1397
1399
1399
1402
1403
1403
1405
1407
1407
1409
1410
1412

INTRODUcTION

Whatever happened to the study of restitution? Once a core
private law subject along with property, torts, and contracts, restitu* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. **

J.D. 1999, University of Michigan. -
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tion has receded from American legal scholarship.' Few law
professors teach the material, fewer still write in the area, and no
one even agrees what the field comprises anymore. 2 Hanoch
Dagan's Unjust Enrichment: A Study of Private Law and Public

Values3 threatens to reverse the tide and make restitution interesting again. The book takes commonplace words such as "value" and
"gain" and shows how they embody a society's underlying normative principles. Variations across cultures in the law of unjust enrichment reflect differences in national understandings of sharing,
property, and even personhood. As Dagan puts it, he seeks "the
reflection of core social values in the technicalities of the law"
(p. 1).

The law at issue can be briefly summarized (and its more tedious complexities elided). Imagine, for example, someone chops
trees from your land. Tort and contract law focus on remedying
your loss. The law of unjust enrichment, however, is primarily concerned with restoring to you the trespasser's gain from using the
lumber. Dagan's book reveals a complex inquiry hiding behind this
simple distinction. Measuring restitution by the defendant's gain is
a prologue to the further analysis of how a society understands
value. Within the American legal system, the tree-chopper's gain
may be defined as the lumber's fair market value, or can be calculated in terms of the chopper's net profits, the full proceeds from
sale, or by a range of increasingly abstract methods. Within a single
legal system, these various measures may all be available, each
linked to restitution of a particular type of resource, each animated
by different normative concerns. Dagan argues that restitutionary
choices within a culture track attitudes towards property and personhood; overarching patterns across cultures reflect divergent national ethoses. Restitution is a window into a larger project of
social understanding.
1. See, e.g., Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CAL. L. Rv. 1191, 1191 (1995)
("Few American lawyers, judges, or law professors are familiar with even the standard propositions of the doctrine ..
" (emphasis omitted)).
2. See Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle,67 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1369,
1371 (1994) ("At one point restitution was a standard course in the upper-year curriculum,
but over time and with the ever greater expansion of public law subjects, it has slowly disappeared from view, being subsumed in a more general course on remedies, or taught in the
interstices of the basic law of property, tort, and contract."); Kull, supra note 1, at 1195 n.14
(noting that restitution was a standard part of the law curriculum a generation ago, but only a
"bare handful of American law schools" offer the course today); Saul Levmore, Explaining
Restitution, 71 U. VA. L. REv. 65, 65 (1985) ("There is probably no greater set of surprising
results and inconsistent maxims in private law than that formed by cases dealing with claims
for payment made by providers of 'non-bargained benefits' to silent or disclaiming
recipients.").
3. Hanoch Dagan is a Senior Lecturer, Tel Aviv University Faculty of Law and a Visiting
Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
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In this review we put Dagan's jurisprudential approach to a
practical test.4 Restitution is going global; today, the postcommunist rebuilding of market economies, social developments in
South Africa and Cuba, and even Native American and African-

American claims are at the cutting edge of restitution.5 We focus

on Eastern Europe, where the Czechs are putting elderly people
back into their childhood apartments, while the Hungarians offer
compensation coupons for use in privatization auctions. 6 Govern-

ments are valuing the unjust gains of inflicted by -

and more often the losses

the communists in radically different ways as they

attempt to reconnect with a precommunist past. Yet little theoretical work explains the rise of and variations among these massive
7
programs of property reallocation.
If Dagan's theory makes sense, and we think it does, then his
book can provide some order for the hodgepodge of national
mythmaking, political accident, and cultural posturing that sur8
rounds the restitution frenzy in newly emerging market economies.

His framework helps explain postcommunist restitutionary programs and points to some surprising results: more aggressive resti-

tution may prove less protective of private property rights. In turn,
the Eastern European experience challenges Dagan's portrayal of
4. A wholly different review of Dagan's book could be written, parsing his jurisprudential
argument on selfhood and altruism in relation to Thomas Nagel, Duncan Kennedy, Joseph
Raz, Ernest Weinrib, and a full host of legal philosophers. We are more practically minded
folk and therefore commend our jurisprudentially oriented colleagues to Dagan's text itself,
particularly Chapters 2 and 3.
5. See, e.g., Frances H. Foster, Restitution of ExpropriatedProperty: Post-Soviet Lessons
for Cuba, 34 CoLUM. J. TRANSNATr. L. 621 (1996); Nell Jessup Newton, Compensation,Reparations, & Restitution: Indian Property Claims in the United States, 28 GA. L. Rev. 453
(1994); Irma Jacqueline Ozer, Reparationsfor African Americans, 41 How. L.J. 479 (1998);
Rob Nixon, White Farms, Black Claims, N.Y. TudEs, May 31, 1994, at A17.
6. See Cheryl Gray, The Legal Framework for Private Sector Activity in the Czech
Republic, 26 Vm,. J. TRA.srArL. L. 271 (1993) (discussing Czech restitution); Cheryl Gray,
Rebecca Hanson & Michael Heller, HungarianLegal Reform for the PrivateSector, 26 GEO.
WASH. J. INTL. L. & ECON. 293, 308-10 (1992) (outlining the coupon compensation program).
7. Postsocialist restitution scholarship is predominantly descriptive. See, e.g., infra note
22. Perhaps the best theoretical discussion is provided by Claus Offe, Disqualification,Retribution, Restitution: Dilemmas of Justice in Post-Communist Transitions, 1 J. POL. PHUZ. 17
(1993).

8. One might argue that postsocialist restitution does not fit within a technical unjust
enrichment paradigm. See Kull, supra note 1, at 1212-22 (arguing that restoration of resources is not part of unjust enrichment). Restoration of property to former owners seems
more concerned with remedying the plaintiffs' losses than undoing the defendant communists' gains. This approach, however, may sound in unjust enrichment law when harm exceeds gain, as was typical in socialist societies. For Dagan's position, see p. 17 (arguing that
plaintiff's harm can be a restitutionary remedy). Many leading commentators have placed
restoration squarely within the law of unjust enrichment. See John P. Dawson, Restitution
Without Enrichment, 61 B.U. L. REv. 563, 610 (1981); Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEXAS L. REv. 1277, 1284 (1989). We do not see much point in

this hyper-formal taxonomic debate. Dagan's method proves useful whether postsocialist
restitution is restitution rightly considered or something else.
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the feel-good ethos of sharing by suggesting a richer and more
troubling take on the meaning of community. By distilling doctrinal complexity through a sensitive jurisprudential filter, Dagan offers a new way to study private law.
II.

ROADMAP TO RESTITUTION

A.

The Argument in Brief

Dagan's book is an easy read. Without too many bows to past
masters, the book is cleanly written and tightly argued. The Prologue encapsulates the story, while the following chapters are a disciplined march through his theory concluding with concrete
applications to and comparisons among American, Talmudic, and
international law.
From a large range of available restitution paradigms, Dagan
focuses solely on the example of a defendant who is unjustly enriched by using a plaintiffs resource.9 Dagan avoids difficulties defining the scope of unjust enrichment in either the American or
comparative setting because his goal is to "abstract[] from the
contextual contingencies of any specific set of restitutionary rules,
and to extricate the essence - the common denominator - of the
ways various societies implement the general principle against unjust enrichment" (p. 3). Across cultures and spanning a breadth of
resources, social values are reflected in methods of valuation. This
is more than a clever semantic point; by linking available measures
of recovery with specific social values, Dagan provides a "translation scheme" for interpreting the meaning of valuation, summarized usefully in a simple table (p. 22).
Dagan has two distinct projects in uneasy relation to each other.
The first project is to explain variations in restitutionary remedies
within a single culture. He relates those variations to the divergent
rationales a society may seek to vindicate across a range of socially
important resources. For example, Chapter Four sets out a detailed
intracultural analysis of Americans' relationship with various resources. The more the specific property implicates its owner's "personhood" - like her body, her land, or maybe her car - the more
likely the legal system will be to protect her control over the property rather than merely to restore her ex ante well-being.
The second project is more ambitious yet: to look across national legal systems and show how distinct national ethoses animate
broader restitutionary patterns. Chapters Five and Six make this
9. This form of restitution is often referred to as "restitution for wrongs" and is concep-

tually, if not analytically, distinct from cases in which a plaintiff confers a benefit on a defendant. See, e.g., ANDREw BuRlows & EwAN McKaNDRICK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
LAW OF RESTITUTION

569 (1997).
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comparison as they explore Talmudic civil law and international law
respectively. While Dagan's first project strikes us as more compelling than the second, both parts of his effort contribute to revaluing
restitution as a field for theoretical work.
B. The Translation Scheme
1. Definitions
Measures of restitutionary recovery range from the harm suffered by a plaintiff to several types of gain secured by a defendant.
Gain, in turn, can mean quite different things, depending on the
doctrinal niche in which the term is invoked. Gain can mean the
fair market value of the appropriated resource or the defendant's
net profits. It can refer to a defendant's gross proceeds from using
an appropriated resource, in which case the defendant will be made
worse-off than before she was unjustly enriched (assuming nonzero
expenses in using the resource). Or gain can be measured as the
greater or lesser of any combination of these values. Dagan points
out that the ex post method of valuation will affect how vigorously
people's resources are protected ex ante from appropriation and
will signal a society's tolerance for appropriating another's property
(p. 15). With the lowest measure of gain, defendants may readily
appropriate resources they believe they can put to better use than
the plaintiff; with the highest measure of gain, defendants may hesitate to take resources despite being confident their uses are more
highly valued.
The question raised by the wide variety of restitutionary remedies is why, for any given resource, a legal system would choose one
remedy over another. Dagan suggests that the specific measures of
recovery noted above express various rationales that a society may
be trying to vindicate, specifically well-being, control, sharing, and
condemnation (pp. 15-16, 22). The argument concentrates primarily
on well-being and control, which are defined by reference to the
familiar distinction between "liability" and "property" rules. 10
Well-being mirrors a liability rule in which "ex post pecuniary recovery is intended as a surrogate for ex ante consent" (p. 15). This

rationale maintains an individual's initial level of wealth. Control,
by contrast, mirrors a property rule by requiring the resource
holder's ex ante consent before the resource may be taken. While
restitution operates in a sphere in which a forced transfer has already occurred, certain rules for recovery can actually vindicate ex
ante control over resources by deterring invasions.
10. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedra 85 HARv. L. IEv. 1089 (1972).

1390
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Dagan's "translation scheme" demonstrates how different measures of restitutionary recovery relate to control, well-being, or both.
Assuming that the plaintiff was harmed less than the defendant was
enriched - a presupposition Dagan makes in his paradigmatic case
(p. 13) - measuring recovery as the plaintiff's harm encourages a
savvy defendant to appropriate resources from plaintiffs who value
them less than either the defendant or the market. In such a case,
measuring restitution by the plaintiff's harm promotes sharing of
resources by encouraging more efficient users to take without permission. Restoring the resource's fair market value protects the
plaintiff's well-being by restoring her to her ex ante level of wealth,
including her ability to sell the resource at market value. A recovery of net profits vindicates the plaintiff's control by removing a
potential appropriator's economic incentive to take the plaintiff's
resources, regardless of the defendant's higher valued use of those
resources. Finally, a recovery of gross proceeds (not offset by the
appropriator's expenses in using the resource) may be reserved for
cases where a society wants not only to protect the plaintiff's control, but also to express its condemnation of the defendant's
action."
These four rationales motivate different levels of recovery and
comprise the heart of Dagan's theory of valuation. 12 "Choosing
amongst these possibilities is not a purely theoretical enterprise;
rather, it dictates and shapes the available remedies" (p. 15). The
pattern of restitution that a national legal system offers - fair market value for certain resources, net profits for others, and so on is, Dagan claims, purposive, nonarbitrary, and subtly revealing of
the contours of a national psyche.
2. American Law Application
In the American legal system, the law of unjust enrichment offers a menu of restitutionary remedies across a spectrum of resources (pp. 71-108). Within this single national setting,
restitutionary awards can be explained by the extent to which they
implicate the owner's "personhood." As Dagan writes:
11. It would be possible to construct a slightly different translation scheme in which
"gross proceeds" were merely another but more effective method of protecting control. If, as
Dagan claims, ex post recovery vindicates control by acting as an ex ante disincentive to ap-

propriate (p. 15), then a higher level of recovery is just a more effective deterrent.
12. Dagan also introduces the concept of proportional profits whereby courts "reconstruct[ ] the way the parties would have divided the contractual surplus under circumstances
of full information" (pp. 19-20). Proportional profits are a useful addition to the traditional

Calabresi & Melamed matrix, protecting something between the resource-holder's well-being
and control. We omit this restitutionary remedy from our Figure 1 and from the remainder
of our account because it does not substantially help us illuminate Dagan's theory or unravel
our postsocialist application.

Revaluing Restitution
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[T]he sphere of control American law is expected to confer on its
constituents will not be absolute, but rather will occur along a continuum of diminishing interests: from core interests (one's identity,
physical integrity, reputation as dignity, and land) through lessprotected interests (copyright, and to a lesser degree, commercial attributes of one's personality and patents) to least-protected interests

(contractual relations and performances and information). [p. 71]
In America, restitutionary recovery for core resources - such as
for a trespass involving land - is often valued at the higher of fair
market value or profits, thus vindicating what Dagan refers to as
"well-being and control" (p. 75). In contrast, patents are protected
from infringement only by an ex post award of fair market value
(pp. 87-89). Dagan suggests that this lower level of protection
shows that patents in America are less personal to their holder than
certain rights in land may be. Therefore, if the infringer can make
more beneficial use of the patent than the market price reflects, he
or she may capture the excess gain and actually be encouraged to
infringe. Figure 1 suggests the relationship Dagan is noting:

:I

x

Proceeds
x

Q Net Profits
r=

FMV

Harm

x

x
Contracts Patents Land

Body

Level of "Personhood"
1: Explaining Variation in American
Restitutionary Remedies
What seems to be arbitrary variation in the definition of gain to
the defendant derives from intracultural values regarding
personhood - a range of restitutionary values available within the
American legal system (summarized in a second useful table, p.
107). Dagan's exploration of Americans' relationship with various
resources is astute, but raises some questions. Why does trespassing on land implicate personhood interests more than infringing on
a patent? Perhaps the level of restitutionary recovery serves as an
indicator of the "personhood quotient," so we learn from the restitutionary rules that Americans value patents less than land. Or the
prediction could work the other way around: if we believe patents
FIGURE
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have lesser personhood quality, we should expect a lower measure
of recovery for their infringement. Because, in fact, we see a lower
recovery, his theory is confirmed. We are not sure which way the
causation runs in what Dagan calls his "retrodictive" approach,
which he defines as "the ability... to predict priorevents: here the
details of the pertinent [restitutionary] doctrines" (p. 8). Dagan
suggests a dynamic relationship between the social understanding
of a resource and its legal protection. "Our attitudes towards one
another and the prescriptions of our legal regime are embedded in
one holistic web, each inculcating,
and inculcated by, the other" (p.
13
39). The claim may be circular.
The predictive (or, as Dagan would say, retrodictive) force of
the argument also leaves out courts' frequent consideration of the
defendant's good or bad faith behavior and numerous other moral
and conventionally utilitarian concerns. For example, how courts
value restitution often depends on whether the defendant was acting in good faith when he wrongly chopped the plaintiff's lumber.
Dagan notes that courts will award gross proceeds if the defendant
was acting in bad faith and the higher of fair market value and profits if the defendant's trespass was unintentional or innocent (p. 74).
While this distinction reflects different rationales for recovery condemnation versus well-being and control - it is unclear to us
why the defendant's motives should matter in Dagan's model,
which asserts that the relevant variables are the national socioeconomic ethos and the character of the resource. An account
could probably be developed to suggest why people in certain societies are more harmed by intentional rather than innocent appropriation. 14 A given society may prefer to protect well-being if the
trespass is unintentional but vindicate control for purposeful invasions. Dagan's account, however, does not explain why this distinction should be true and leaves us to ponder the ambiguous role of
the defendant's bad faith in his model. 15 Nevertheless, Dagan's
13. For example, we find Dagan's suggestion that patents are less personal than copyrights plausible but not obvious. As evidence for his claim, Dagan points to the different

methods of valuing patent and copyright infringement (pp. 82-89). The argument, however,
seems to assume what he is trying to prove: that methods of valuation correspond to the
personhood quotient of various resources.
14. Cf. Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of

Takings, 112 HARV. L. REv. 997, 1007-09 (1999) (arguing that a per se takings rule for physical invasions - such as that suggested by Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419 (1982) - may lead to perverse results if government agencies respond by inflicting more costly, but nonphysical and hence noncompensable harms on property owners);
Frank I. Michehnan, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. Rlv. 1165, 1227 (1967) (suggesting that "[aJctual,

physical use or occupation by the public of private property may make it seem rather specially likely that the owner is sustaining a distinctly disproportionate share of the cost of some
social undertaking.").

15. The defendant's motives have long been a source of debate in the restitution scholarship. See John P. Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1410

May 1999]

1393

Revaluing Restitution

framework does analytic work explaining the otherwise odd variety
of methods that courts use to value a- defendant's gain.
C. Restitution and National Ethos
Dagan's second argument is that legal systems are each characterized by a "socio-economic ethos" that varies along a scale of
communitarian fellow-feeling. The book's final two chapters make
this point by moving from an intra- to an intercultural analysis. In
particular, Dagan switches to the quite distinct system of Talmudic
civil law, parsing ancient religious texts to uncover the animating
ethos of Jewish law. Given their different traditions, juxtaposing
American and Talmudic law could be an odd choice if one system
were intended to inform, or comment on the other. Dagan, however, uses the very heterogeneity of the systems he studies as a way
to sharpen distinctions. 16 For these purposes, Imperial Chinese law
could have been equally apt as a comparison.
Dagan's approach seems straightforward. Various measures of
recovery encourage different levels of appropriation or involuntary
resource transfers: namely, restitution affects the amount of forced
sharing. Cross-cultural variations in the measure of restitutionary
recovery reflect differences in societies' communitarianism specifically, and social ethos generally. For example, with Americans,
"one can expect that the rules of the American doctrine will be
concentrated mainly between control and well-being.

. .

. The

American commitment to the individualistic values of desert and
negative liberty is moderated by some -

albeit fairly weak -

egali-

tarian and needs-based convictions" (pp. 60-61). And indeed, the
American legal system often measures restitutionary gain by the
defendant's net profits; thus reducing incentives to appropriate by
recapturing any possible gain from using a wrongfully taken
resource. 17

By contrast, in a more collective legal culture, people may sometimes permit appropriations when society gains overall. If a restitutionary award only restores the amount the original owner is
harmed, then potential appropriators may take resources they can
(1974). Dagan's desire to address the issue is understandable but seemingly outside his analytic structure.
16. See p. 7 ("[C]omparative law is instrumental in establishing a 'liberating distance'
from the dominant legal consciousness, thus uncovering the political and moral (often hidden) significance of legal doctrine. However, in order to be able to enjoy this important
advantage, the comparativist should refer to legal systems that are set in environments which
are culturally remote from our contemporary Western circumstances.").
17. Of course, people will still have an incentive to appropriate others' resources if their
chance of being successfully sued is less than 100%. Nevertheless, awarding net profits acts
as a more significant ex ante deterrent for potential appropriators than awarding fair market
value (assuming that the appropriator can put the resource to an unusually valuable use).
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better use and retain any difference between the harm inflicted and
the gain received. Dagan characterizes such a culture as sharingoriented and offers Talmudic law as an example of this more communitarian ethos, noting that: "It seems safe to conjecture that the
Judaic doctrinal rules are more of the sharing type" (p. 61). Across
cultures, then, the tone or shape of restitution partakes of and in
turn helps to constitute ingrained national values (p. 39).
This may in fact be the case, but the Talmudic case study Dagan
provides is not entirely parallel to the American law examples.
Dagan effectively uses the American system to demonstrate intracultural variation, but he does not provide comparable detail on
the Talmudic law side. He focuses instead on a single (though apparently much-parsed) hypothetical: "[W]here the defendant derives a benefit and the plaintiff sustains no loss, for example where
the premises of the plaintiff-landowner were not for hire (so that
the harm was zero), and the defendant-squatter had no alternative
accommodations" (p. 113). In such a case a Talmudic "exemption
rule" applies, permitting the squatter-defendant to keep the
amount he was enriched by the trespass. This outcome, Dagan
claims, reflects the ethos of sharing embedded in the Talmudic law.
The rule does not apply, however, the moment the plaintiff suffers
some harm. Further exceptions to the "exemption rule" also limit
its applicability so that the rule does not tell us much about the
Talmudic ethic as a whole or give much footing for making an intercultural comparison.'
The "exemption rule" may indeed reflect a religious ethos concerned with sharing. It might be possible to generalize from this
one example and explore how Talmudic civil law embodies a communitarian concern in other, unexpected cases. It might also be
possible to demonstrate that the Talmudic law of restitution differs
from the American law with regard to specific resources, perhaps
from culturally different understandings of the relevant resource.
Yet Dagan does not make the direct comparison, leaving the reader
to infer the contrast between American and Talmudic law.
Dagan concludes with a look at international law, where he attempts to find a coherent ethos regarding compensation for governmental expropriation. 19 We find this chapter the least persuasive
because the issue of expropriation in international law remains a

18. Those further exceptions include cases where the plaintiff protests (pp. 120-21), where

there is any positive enrichment to the defendant in the form of profits (pp. 121-24), and
where the defendant is willing to pay (pp. 124-27). Dagan has, however, chosen an example
that is central to Talmudic civil law.

19. As an aside, when an individual takes your resource without permission, we call it
"appropriation"; when a government takes the resource, we term it "expropriation."
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source of conflict, not coherence.20 More generally, this material
raises some questions about Dagan's method itself. He notes that
the effort to identify a national "socio-economic ethos" cuts across
"numerous different traditions" and "ideological conflicts" (p. 51),
but he nevertheless claims to capture some generalized "essence"
of specific societies and legal systems - American, Talmudic, and
international. Can an ethos be so easily distilled? The stereotype
that Americans value negative liberty is ubiquitous, but hard to pin
down. Do Texans value negative liberty more than Michiganders?
Conservatives more than liberals? The vast array of American values does not easily accommodate a single national ethos.
Our natural objection to being neatly categorized perhaps obscures some plausible truth to Dagan's claim. Americans may be
more committed to negative liberty than people in some other
countries. On the Talmudic side, it is hardly surprising to find a
religious code concerned at some level with sharing, for one would
expect to find the same in every other religion's ethical texts. But
how does this aspirational document connect with the national
ethos of contemporary Jews? Of Israelis? And, while it is improbable enough to discern a coherent ethos within a national or religious
culture, we find ethos hunting even less credible at the international
level.
A second difficulty with Dagan's presentation is how to tease
apart the relationship between intracultural attitudes towards personhood and an intercultural ethos of sharing. For any particular
resource, a difference in the restitutionary remedy between two
legal systems is susceptible to either a resource-specific or national
ethos explanation. Imagine, for example, that the American legal
system has more control-oriented restitutionary remedies for unjust
enrichment involving cars than the (updated) Talmudic response.
This difference could equally result from an idiosyncratic attachment to cars in American culture as it could from a pervasive Talmudic emphasis on sharing transportation. Figure 2 suggests two
ways in which the Talmudic system might differ from the American.
Under the Sharing Interpretation, the Talmud places a systematically higher value on sharing and thus offers lower restitutionary
remedies for each resource on the personhood continuum. By contrast, according to the Personhood Interpretation, the Talmud
places different personhood weights on particular resources so that
some resources receive more protection than in the American system, some less, some coincidentally the same. Dagan does not offer
20. See, e.g., MARK W. JANs, AN INRODUCrION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 246-47 (3d ed.

1999) (noting that whether there are "customary norms of international law providing international minimum standards that all states must meet regardless of treaty obligations is

highly controversial, the positions of the Western states being much at odds with those of
Third World nations").
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a sufficiently parallel or detailed comparison to allow the reader to
decide whether Talmudic law is systematically more sharingoriented, or whether it simply treats some particular resources as
more invested in a person's essence than does the American
system.

tAmerican
Proceeds
Net Profits

-Talmudic (personhood)

FMV

Talmudic (sharing)

Harm
Contracts Patents Land Body
Level of "Personhood"

FiGuRE

2:

Untangling Personhoodand Sharing in
InterculturalComparisons

This level of detailed comparison, however, goes beyond
Dagan's project. He succeeds in his more important goal of revealing that restitutionary remedies may have a coherent structure
explained by the intracultural factors and intercultural ethoses he
identifies. Regardless of the precision of his comparisons, Dagan
shows that methods of valuation can embody vastly different social
values. His theory provides a theoretical context for thinking more
systematically about the problem of valuation in law. Valuation of
gain or harm, often dismissed as a merely technical matter, reflects
normative principles at the core of a national legal ethos. Applied
to the problem of restitution, Dagan's framework explains otherwise incongruous measures of recovery.
More generally, Dagan addresses the undertheorized link between concrete measures of valuation and abstract social values. If
his approach succeeds, then it should be able to teach us something
about new situations - such as the restitutionary practices in diverse transitions from socialist to market economies. Restitution is
not only an interesting theoretical puzzle, as Dagan shows, but also
a value-laden policy adventure in much of the world today.
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PUTTING RESTITUTION TO T=E TEST

Restitution has been a core element of postsocialist transition,

transferring the equivalent of billions of dollars in resources to prior
owners. While the recent frenzy of restitution has been most exten-

sive in Eastern Europe, new programs keep popping up elsewhere

as well. 21 The programs' forms are as numerous as the countries

that are adopting them. The question we take up here is whether
the diversity among restitution programs expresses something more
than interesting curiosity or contingent political fact. Recent literature on restitution, mainly describing postsocialist transition in
Eastern Europe, does not help solve the puzzle.22 Some commentators suggest that restitution reflects attempts by weak new governments to distinguish themselves from communist predecessors;
others say that restitution may be an expedient way to shift resources to private ownership. Perhaps the programs represent simple power politics. Perhaps not. These accounts fail to make sense
of the variety of restitutionary rules.
Dagan's method suggests a more useful way to think about restitution, going beyond dry technicalities to the guts of nationbuilding.3 Choices about who gets what back may help us discern
core national attitudes towards important resources. Note, though,
that just as Dagan's approach helps explain postsocialist restitution,
real-world practice, in turn, challenges and refines Dagan's theory.
A.

The Relationship Between Privatizationand Restitution

Most of the time we acquire property through purchase or
through some other method that accepts the prior owner's title as
legitimate. When a country shifts away from socialism, however,
this basic equation is disrupted and policymakers are cast out into
an uncertain wilderness of first principles. State property, including
21. See supra note 5 (noting South African, Cuban, Native-American, and African-American cases).
22. See, e.g., Josef Burger, Politics of Restitution in Czechoslovakia, 26 E.EURO. Q.485
(1993); Anna Gelpern, The Laws and Politics of Reprivatization in East-CentralEurope: A
Comparison, 14 U. PA. J. INT.Bus. L. 315 (1993); Offe, supra note 7; Jeffrey J. Renzulli,
Claims of U.S. Nationals Under the Restitution Laws of Czechoslovakia, 15 B.C. IrNr. &
Comp. L. Rnv. 165 (1992); Richard W. Crowder, Comment, Restitution in the Czech
Republic: Problems and Prague-Nosis,5 IND. NTI.. & COM. L. Rv. 237 (1994); Michael L.
Neff, Comment, Eastern Europe's Policy of Restitution of Property in the 1990s, 10 DIcK. J.
INTL.L. 357 (1992); Heather M. Stack, Note, The "Colonization" of East Germany?: A ComparativeAnalysis of German Privatization,46 DuKE LJ.1211 (1997); Frank B6nker & Claus
Offe, The Morality of Restitution: Considerations on Some Normative Questions Raised by
the Transition to a Private Economy (June 18, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
authors).
23. See also Gelpern, supra note 22, at 317 ("Extremely popular despite their uncertain
economic significance, reprivatization initiatives offer insights into the nation-building agendas of the governments which preside over them."). Note that in the transition literature, the
term "reprivatization" is synonymous with "restitution."
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nearly everything with economic value, is put up for grabs. And
because people do grab, decisions about restitution programs must
be made quickly before "spontaneous privatization" (a nice, postsocialist term for wholesale theft of state assets) renders the problem moot. 24
Before defining a restitution program, a country must decide
which resources to keep public -

parks? railroads? streets?

-

and

which to transfer to private ownership. They may transfer resources through a privatization program - giveaway vouchers?
sales? auctions? - or through restitution. Each of these initial decisions is fraught with political meaning. Privatization of a factory
by sale or auction partly legitimizes the prior socialist ownership of
the factory, even as it practically makes funds available for the new
reformist government. Giveaways of apartments to the current occupants imply that those occupants already rightfully own the
apartments while recognizing their real need for a place to stay.
Each mode of privatization carries its own verdict on the prior
property regime. 5
The relationship between restitution and privatization in postsocialist reforms is perhaps a useful one to note. Wherever it
reaches, restitution denies the claims of current occupants or state
owners. Restitution reknits a country with its distant past, excises
the socialist period, and labels as unjust any intervening ownership.
In Dagan's terms, the more that restitution prevails, the more it
may reveal a national ethos committed to negative liberty; while
privatization may suggest (in a surprising twist) a greater ethos of
sharing.
Consider the ratio of privatization to restitution programs as
one moves from west to east across Europe. While all the countries
have privatized widely, the former East Germany also has a farreaching restitution program, the Central European countries have
some restitution, and Russia has none.26 Consistent with Dagan's
theory, the Russians lived the longest under a nominally sharingoriented socialist regime and they have the shallowest tradition of
entrepreneurship (even before the Soviets, the Tsar's feudal system
left little room for dispersed individual landownership). East
Germany, conversely, retained a robust private property regime
even under communist rule, maintaining a control-oriented concep24. See generally WORLD BANK, WORUD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1996: FROM PLAN TO
MARKET 48-63 (1996) (outlining options for privatization and paths taken by postsocialist

countries).

25. See Gelpern, supra note 22, at 315; Stack, supra note 22, at 1221 ("In theory, then,
restitution sought to achieve a degree of parity between historic injustices and current economic needs.").

26. See generally Gelpern, supra note 22.
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tion of private property rights that perhaps finds new voice in the
country's restitution laws.
B.

The Variety of Restitution

Vindicating precommunist ownership through restitution raises
diverse problems. Notice, however, how closely the situation parallels Dagan's basic paradigm but on a massive scale. Socialist rulers
divested people of their property in forced transfers (now deemed
unjust) to new owners whom the state believed could make more
valuable use of the expropriated resources.
While restitutionary programs vary tremendously in their details,2 7 we group the variety along four main axes:28 (1) The types of
lost resources that may be restituted - only real property? corporate stock? prison time? (2) The people who can benefit - only
living citizens? exiles? corporations? religious communities? (3)
The form that restitution takes - the land itself? roughly
equivalent land? current or former fair market value? partial cash
payment or voucher? 29 And (4) the time period that restitution
covers - excising only the socialist period? stretching back to
cover Nazi expropriations of Jews and others?
Each point is fiercely contested, and each helps us to reflect on
Dagan's project. Just as Dagan pares away the multitude of restitutionary paradigms to focus on a single case, we focus on a single
contrast, between the Czech Republic and Hungary, to motivate
our discussion. The former East Germany and Russia may work as
well. So may Poland and Lithuania. Our pairing is open to a similar criticism as Dagan's paradigm - that a different choice may
result in quite a different story. We offer the same defense as does
he: we are only testing his method, not offering an exhaustive account of postsocialist restitution. With those disclaimers, we note
that the Czech Republic and Hungary form a sufficiently complex
comparison to start thinking about how national practice, national
ethos, and attitudes towards property and personhood might interact in postsocialist transition.
1. Restitution in the Czech Republic
Restitution in the Czech Republic is one of the largest such programs in Eastern Europe. Favoring a policy of "natural" restitution
(an interesting word choice as we shall see), the Czech government
is restoring a still inestimable amount of property to its precom27. See id. at 315-16.
28. See iL at 323.
29. See Neff, supra note 22, at 361.
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munist owners or their heirs.30 Truck drivers, shoe moguls, western
bankers, human rights activists, elderly men and women with distant memories of expropriated properties, and heirs to ancient es-

tates are among the many people repossessing property in the
former Czechoslovakia (now separated into the Czech Republic,
where we focus our attention, and Slovakia, which we do not examine). 31 The Czech Republic's sweeping restitutionary program
codifies normative policy decisions along each of the four axes that
are controversial in Eastern European transition.
Three Czech laws together create a comprehensive program of
restitution.32 All three laws codify a preference for "natural" restitution, which gives property back to its "original" owner.3 3 When
the property's value increased significantly during communist possession, however, monetary compensation is sometimes awarded,
equivalent to fair market value at the time of expropriation. 34 This
alternative is subject to strict monetary caps on the cash any single
claimant may receive, the balance being paid in riskier state securities.35 For the most part, not surprisingly, most nonagricultural
30. See Gelpem, supra note 22, at 359-60 ("[R]emarkably few figures are available to
gauge the cost of restitution in the Czech Republic."). The figure of $10 billion is often
quoted, but not verified. See id
31. See, e.g., Janet Guyon, Noble Rot"As the Czechs Return Confiscated Property, Real
Estate Languishes, WALL ST. J. EuRoPE, May 6, 1993, at 1 (33-year-old banker in Monte
Carlo, who had never been to Czechoslovakia, became a Czech prince through his father's
restitution claims); Kitty McKinsey, Bata Shows You Can Go Home Again: 56 Years After
Fleeing,Shoe King Is Inspirationin Land of His Birth, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 21, 1994, at D4;
Marjorie Miller, Noble Try to Reclaim Heritage,L.A. TIMEs, July 3, 1994, at 1A (80-year-old
Joseph Kinsky, who regained his castle after years working in communist uranium mines);
Shailagh Murray, Real Estate: Prague Property Prices a Case for Kafka, WALL ST. J.
EUROPE, Jan. 31, 1994, at 36; Hannah Rothschild, Coming Home, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Mar.

12, 1994, at 38 ("[A family friend] lost everything in 1948. He went to live in a woodman's
cottage and got a job driving trucks for a former employee. Last year, at the age of 74, he got
his estates back. His boss was heard to say, 'I have lost my best driver but at least I've got my
best landlord back."').
32. The Small Restitution Law, enacted in 1989, restores private residences, small businesses, stores, and workshops expropriated between 1955 and 1959. See, e.g., Burger, supra
note 22, at 486; Renzulli, supra note 22, at 178. The second law, the so-called Large Restitution Law, was enacted in 1991 and provides restitution for most other, larger property expropriated after 1948 and not covered by the Small Restitution Law. See, e.g., Burger, supra
note 22, at 486; Gelpern, supra note 22, at 336. Finally, agricultural land is restored under a
different regime codified by the Federal Land Law. Because agriculture was one of the few
economic sectors to perform better than disastrously under communist rule, the Czech government was loath to disaggregate productive collective farms and threaten the nation's food
production. See Burger, supra note 22, at 487.
33. See Crowder, supra note 22, at 239-40; see also Burger, supra note 22, at 485-86 ("The
concept of returning tangible real or personal property to rightful owners or their heirs seems
at first sight simple enough.... The lapse of forty years, after all, was not long enough to
have erased memories of who had owned what. Nor were the public records, albeit modified
by the Marxists, rendered useless for identifying lawful owners of properties as recorded
before the... 1948 coup.").
34. See Crowder, supra note 22, at 242.
35. See Gelpern, supranote 22, at 338. ("Cash compensation under the Large ... Restitution Law may not exceed... about $1,000").
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property decreased in value during communism and "[m]any of the
properties are returned
in poor condition or beyond repair from
'36 *
years of neglect.
As with all restitutionary schemes in Eastern Europe, the Czech
program met with substantial internal political resistance. Three
principal objections were frequently voiced. First, the laws only
cover property that was expropriated between the start of the communist regime in 1948 and its end in 1989 and thus exclude Jewish
claims for property seized by the Nazis and claims by Sudeten
Germans for property seized after the war by the Czechs.37 Second,
the Czech program excludes foreigners and even Czech nationals
living abroad from claiming restitution.38 This decision has generated controversy within expatriate Czech communities as it severely
limits the scope
of the restitutionary claims that might otherwise be
39
available.
Ultimately, however, the most salient objection is to the form of
restitution; restoring property in kind comes with efficiency and distributional consequences. Many political actors argued for privatizing property instead by selling it to the highest bidder. 40 Selling the
resources would be relatively more likely to transfer assets to people motivated to use them effectively without muddying title.
Privatization sale proceeds would simultaneously give the bankrupt
new government resources to fund crucial programs - such as improving infrastructure and coping with emerging environmental disasters -

or for making restitution.41

Nevertheless, restitution went forward on the massive scale
originally contemplated. The complex implementation of Czech
restitution has even taken priority over the slow process towards
privatization. 42 Commentators have alternatively charged natural
restitution with both economic catastrophe 43 and fiscal salvation for
36. Crowder, supra note 22, at 254; see also Neff, supra note 22, at 369.
37. See Stack, supra note 22, at 1242; Crowder, supra note 22, at 242-43; Robert

Hochstein, Note, Jewish PropertyRestitution in the Czech Republic, 19 B.C. INTL.& CoNP. L.
REv. 423, 423 (1997).
38. See Renzuill, supra note 22, at 178-81; Stack, supra note 22, at 1242-43. But see Neff,
supra note 22, at 372 (arguing that the restriction may be less prohibitive than some Czech
expatriates believe).
39. See Neff, supra note 22, at 372.
40. See id.at 370.
41. See Bdnker & Offe, supra note 22, at 48.
42. See Neff, supra note 22, at 370.
43. See, e.g., Gelpern, supra note 22, at 325-26 ("'Arguments that an extensive restitution
of property in kind is the fastest form of privatization is [sic] a fiction.... Instead of speeding

up privatization, it would actually slow it down and prolong it perhaps for decades.'" (quoting BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library,

BBCSWB File)); Crowder, supra note 22, at 252-56 (describing the "problems resulting from
restitution in kind").
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the Czech Republic. 44 All, however, appear to agree that natural
restitution signals a strong commitment to protecting private property.45 The Czech Republic's comprehensive program is often contrasted with Hungary's more limited restitutionary policies. 46
2. Restitution in Hungary
Hungary took a substantially different path from the Czech
Republic. Often described as "limited" compensation, Hungarian
restitution provides no natural restitution but instead pays fixed
rates for property taken by the communists. 47 The fixed values applied to property usually restore only a token percentage of the
property's actual value. Claims up to $2,300 are compensated in
full; the next $1,150 are compensated 50%; the next $2,300 get 30%;
and amounts above these totals get 10% up to a maximum compensation of about $57,000.48
Hungarian restitution is not "limited" merely because of the undervaluation of restorable property. The form of the restitution,
too, is more restricted than in the Czech Republic. Instead of cash,
the Hungarian government pays original owners their compensation in state-created coupons. 49 While these coupons are freely
tradable securities, they are not fully liquid for five years and are
intended to be used to repurchase state-owned property.50 The
modest Hungarian goal is "partial indemnification, not reprivatization." 51 Although early versions of the restitution laws allowed
farmers to use their coupons to redeem their precommunist land
holdings, the Hungarian Constitutional Court struck down this provision on the grounds that "it discriminated against former owners
44. See, e.g., Neff, supra note 22, at 369-70 (describing the economic success of Czech
restitution resulting from its comprehensive protection of property ownership).
45. See Gelpern, supra note 22, at 318 (calling the Czech program "all-out restitution");
Neff, supra note 22, at 369.

46. See Gelpern, supra note 22, at 316; Bdnker & Offe, supra note 22, at 11-12.
47. See Gelpern, supra note 22, at 328 ("Hungary's limited compensation program reflects an atypical influence of the technocrats in its post-socialist politics .... "). Gelpern may

overstate the significance of the political factors: initial restitution laws in Hungary provided
for natural restitution.
48. See Gray et al., supra note 6, at 309; see also Gelpern, supra note 22, at 344; Neff,
supra note 22, at 373-74. The scale incorporates a complicated set of valuation guidelines:
"For non-agricultural real estate, compensation is measured in proportion to the area ...
depending on the present location. Classifications include Budapest, provincial towns, villages and vacant lots outside any of the enumerated areas." Gelpern, supra note 22, at 344.
Equally specific guidelines determine the restitutable value of corporations depending on the
size of the workforce employed at the time of the expropriation. See id.

49. See Gelpern, supra note 22, at 344-46.
50. See Neff, supra note 22, at 374.
51. Id. at 376. Again, "reprivatization" means "restitution" in the transition literature.
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of urban and industrial'52property, who were not given the possibility
of natural restitution.
On the other hand, Hungarian restitution is broader than its
Czech counterpart in two interesting respects: first, it reaches back
to 1939 so it covers Nazi expropriations of Jews; and second, restitution can be granted to nonnationals and nonresidents. 53 Given its
other restrictions, these looser requirements may seem surprising.
These factors have not, however, resulted in the anticipated flood
of restitutionary claims. The Hungarian National Compensation
Office, operating out of a former brothel, has needed to extend
deadlines for filing claims several times for apparent lack of interest
in the program.54 As of 1996, five years after Hungary's original
restitution law was enacted, only seventy-five percent of restitution
coupons had been issued, with a face value of approximately $650
million. 55 This is dramatically less than the two to four billion dollar price tag originally anticipated. 56 Hungary's restitution has proceeded on a much smaller scale than its Czech neighbors' program.
C. Gaps in the Existing Literature
1. Why Restitute Property At All?
Facing substantial political opposition, the Czech Republic and
Hungary nevertheless persevered with restitutionary programs.
The short-term economic cost of restitution has been high, hardly a
surprise. In particular, natural restitution overburdens weak new
legal institutions because of problems associated with unclear title,
the condition of the property being returned, and the creation of
numerous wrenching conflicts between current and former owners.5 7 Even the Hungarian program creates a substantial legal and
administrative headache. The best reasoning counsels against restitution at all. As Jon Elster has written:
It is important to keep in mind that essentially everybody suffered
under Communism. Whereas some lost their property, others many others - had opportunities denied to them through the arbitrary or tyrannical behavior of the authorities.... It would be arbi52. See Gray et al., supranote 6, at 309 n.111; see also Peter Paczolay, JudicialReview of

the Compensation Law in Hungary, 13 MIcH. J. INmT. L. 806, 813-17 (1992); B6nker & Offe,
supra note 22, at 34 ("It took three decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court to limit
the preferential treatment for land. According to the first draft of the... law, expropriated
land would have been given back, whereas other kinds of confiscated property would have

been only compensated.").
53. See Gelpern, supra note 22, at 343, 347.

54. See id. at 348, 363.
55. See European Bank for Reconstruction & Development, Transition Report 6 (Nov. 3,
1997), available in Westlaw, 1997 WL 18308670.

56. See Gelpern, supra note 22, at 363.
57. See Crowder, supra note 22, at 249-57.
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trary and wrong to single out one group of victims - the owners of
tangible property - for compensation.... Property rights are, in my
opinion, among the least rather than most inviolable rights. Those
protecting individual dignity, autonomy, and privacy are much more
central ....

Full compensation to some of the victims cannot be de-

fended as a second-best approximation to the
58 ideal of universal compensation, if that ideal itself is meaningless.

Given these arguments, why restitution? Some commentators
have suggested that long-term economic gains may offset any current economic slowdown.5 9 Restitution is undoubtedly a "technique to build a private economy, '60 at least in part. It may serve as
a signaling mechanism to Western investors that their investments
will be protected - "restitution enhances the credibility of economic reform by demonstrating the government's belief in the virtues of private property."'61 Also, it transfers resources to former
owners who may then trade them to more productive users than
socialist owners. The complexity of large-scale restitution, however, weakens the efficiency point just as Elster's arguments undermine justice claims. In the Czech case, the commitment to natural
restitution is perplexing. Full monetary recovery is as strong a signaling mechanism, but it would permit the current government to
sell land to the highest bidder and create clear title. 62
Economic policy can perhaps help explain Hungary's more limited program of restitution. The country began transition with a
heavy debt load and, perhaps, could not afford to restore as much
as its neighbors. 63 Why, though, if fiscal constraints were of such
concern, would Hungary have expanded the group of people eligible for restitution to include foreigners? Perhaps Hungary made a
sophisticated decision to adopt a modest program for all, while the
Czechs decided on more comprehensive restitution for native
Czechs alone. But this distinction only begs the question of why a
58. Jon Elster, On Doing What One Can: An Argument Against Post-Communist Restitu-

tion and Retribution, E. EUR. CoNsT. REv., Summer 1992, at 15, 16-17. Other commentators
have explored restitution through the lens of moral duty. See Offe, supra note 7, at 43
("[Tihe moral objection may be raised that it is unfair that, within the universe of victims of
the old regime, the subset of expropriatedowners ofproductive assets alone can [claim restitution]."). After analyzing the legitimacy of the original expropriations according to both deontological and consequentialist standards, Bbnker and Offe conclude that moral arguments
cannot justify restitution. See B6nker & Offe, supra note 22, at 47.
59. See Crowder, supra note 22, at 262 ("[P]roviding the Czechs with some sense of justice for the egregious wrongs committed by the communists appears to be a necessary step to
growing the cause of democracy and economic reform. Not taking this step might have resulted in a much worse long range outcome for the Czechs.").
60. B6nker & Offe, supra note 22, at 11.
61. Id. at 21; see also Crowder, supra note 22, at 240, 250.
62. See Crowder, supra note 22, at 257-58 (objecting to natural restitution because of its
inefficiency).
63. See Gelpern, supra note 22, at 330.
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country would prefer one approach to another. The difference between the Hungarian and Czech programs reflects more than the
depth of their respective pockets. Both were broke. While economic interests must surely be motivating some of the choices in
the restitutionary movement, they cannot provide a fully satisfying
story and do not adequately explain restitution's various contours
across resources, even in the two neighboring countries we are
considering.
2.

Why Natural Restitution?

Full restitution of economic value seems unlikely enough, but
returning specific plots of land to their owners from half a century
ago seems incredible. Two plausible justifications have been given
for natural restitution. In the first days of transition, only discredited former communists had sufficient resources to purchase property sold on the market. Natural restitution was an expensive
attempt to keep the property out of their hands (and even more
crucially for the Czechs, a way to keep property away from potential German buyers). 4 Natural restitution, however, may not have
been up to this task. Because of the level of disrepair of most real
property, many entitled owners refused to file restitutionary claims.
The result has sometimes been the transfer of vast quantities of
land to outsiders - the only people who can afford to maintain the
property.65 Natural restitution may be largely motivated by a desire to keep property out of ex-communist and German hands, but
its effects are conflicting at best and counterproductive at worst.
Natural restitution remains intuitively appealing in a manner
not captured by economic concerns - putting an elderly widow (or
more likely, her heirs) back in her childhood apartment, the one
she has longingly walked by for five decades. Somehow, then, restitution participates in a moment of personal and cultural definition.
When a country signals its change to a new regime, it sends a
message to its own citizens, at least as much as to foreign investors.
Yes, restoring property indicates a renewed commitment to private
ownership, but it also distinguishes the new regime's commitments
from its communist predecessors' illegitimacy.

64. See It Still Hurts, THi ECONOMIST, May 21, 1994, at 58 (noting that Vaclav Havel, the
Czech President, was "adamantly opposed to compensation" for the 2.5 million Sudeten
Germans expelled at the end of WWII); see also Offe, supra note 7, at 42 n.59.
65. See Crowder, supranote 22, at 254-55. "George Lobkowicz, a European banker who
had never been to Czechoslovakia, recently became a Czech prince, and his family became
one of the country's biggest landowners as a result of the restitution laws." Id. at 255.
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Restitution has sometimes been cast in terms of "national rebirth and 'moral purification," 66 an attitude that may explain the
preference for natural citizens and the precision with which governments choose the dates for restorable expropriations. Limiting the
class of people eligible to claim restitution helps create a mythical
cultural identity; it serves as a tacit statement about who counts as
"real" Czechs or Hungarians in these newly emerging states. 67
Shlomo Avineri noticed that most former socialist countries, including the Czech Republic, chose cut off dates for restitution that coincided with the most ethnically pure moment in the country's
history. 68 In the Czech case, this was just after the Nazis had murdered the centuries-old Jewish community, and the Czechs had brutally expelled an equally rooted German community. 69 Similarly,
the Lithuanians chose the moment when the Jews and the Poles had
been murdered and kicked out;70 the Poles when the Jews,
Germans, and Russians were gone; 71 and so on. Restitution, then,
serves as part of national myth making, linking people to an
imagined (or hoped for), ethnically pure past; that is, linking today's citizens to the "natural" owners of national private property.
Avineri's understanding of restitution leads us nicely into
Dagan's framework. What myth is a country creating or evidencing
through its restitutionary scheme? If restitution does not result
only from contingent political and economic facts, 72 then Dagan's
theory suggests that each country's program may embody important - and importantly different - socioeconomic characteristics.
Identifying these differences opens another level of subtlety
through which to understand postsocialist societies.
66. Gelpern, supranote 22, at 323 (borrowing terminology from Vratislav Pechota, Privatization and Foreign Investment in Czechoslovakia: The Legal Dimension, 24 VAND. J.
TRANSNATL. L. 305, 308 (1991)).

67. See Gelpern, supra note 22, at 356 ("All of the reprivatization initiatives generally
bypass or subordinate the claims of ethnic minorities, most of which had been expropriated
in succession prior to the relevant cut-off dates .... ).
68. Shlomo Avineri, Lecture at the Conference on Restitution in Eastern Europe,
Central European University, Budapest, Hungary (June 18-19, 1993).
69. See Stephen A. Denburg, Note, Reclaiming Their Past: A Survey of Jewish Efforts to
Restitute European Property, 18 B.C. THiD WORLD L.J. 233, 256-57 (1998).
70. See William Valletta, The Hesitant Privatization of Lithuanian Land, 18 FORDHAM
INTL. LJ. 198, 203-04 (1994) (limiting restitution to current citizens willing to farm the land).
71. See William R. Youngblood, Note, Poland's Struggle for a Restitution Policy in the
1990s, 9 EMORY INTL. L. Rnv. 645, 646 (1995).
72. For example, we are assuming that Hungary's limited restitutionary program was a
result of more than the poor showing of its prorestitution party at the polls. See Offe, supra
note 7, at 26-27; Gelpern, supra note 22, at 318 (arguing that "the likelihood of passing strong
restitution measures varies inversely with the strength of the left and the technocrats in the
political arena" which in turn depends on "the manner of each country's transition from state
socialism."). There should be an interesting story to tell beyond these political accidents.
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D. PostsocialistRestitution Through the Dagan Prism
What can Dagan's approach tell us about the Czechs and
Hungarians? And what do their experiences tell us about his theory? Dagan's framework suggests we look for messages hidden in
postsocialist restitution programs. Interpreting these messages requires some work. The remainder of this review is a tentative first
step.
1.

Of Control and Well-Being

First, consider natural restitution. To the Czechs, it may signal
condemnation of certain expropriations and a commitment to particular victims of communism; to outsiders, it may signal a better
73
investment climate with renewed respect for private property. Intuitively, natural restitution seems like a strong commitment to individual liberty and a rejection of sharing through forced transfers.
It appears to stand in sharp contrast to Hungary's limited compensation. This preliminary conclusion may be too simple, however.
In Dagan's hierarchy of restitutionary values, return of the rundown original property does not vindicate either the original
owner's control or her well-being. What is going on?
According to Dagan's translation scheme, restitutionary remedies that vindicate control do so by removing a potential expropriator's ex ante incentives to take property unjustly. Natural
restitution fails this test. According to the Czech program, communist expropriators return property only when it makes them no
worse off than before the taking. In the rare cases when the communists increased the property's value, the original owner does not
benefit.74 Dagan would term the unusual rationale motivating this
system "well-being or control"; it permits recovery of only the lesser
of fair market value and profits and is rarely used. Dagan notes,
[T]he well-being or control rationale reverses forced transfers only in
so far as the remedy does not diminish the defendant's ex ante level of
welfare. This creates an incentive effect of encouraging forced transfers .... [which] not only encourages efficient transfers, but encourages all transfers indiscriminately. This may be the reason why the
well-being or control rationale is not evident in any case or statute
covered by this book. It can thus be safely omitted from our translation scheme. [p. 21]
73. See B6nker & Offe, supra note 22, at 21.

74. See Neff, supra note 22, at 369 (describing the Czech law that requires original owners
of the rare property that has increased in value to remit the difference to the expropriator).
The Large Restitution Law, however, may be ambiguous in its treatment of property that has
increased in value. The relevant baseline may be the date when the Law went into effect and

not the date of the original expropriation. Under this interpretation, the original owner is
only responsible for compensating increases in value since 1991 when the Large Restitution
Law was enacted. See Gelpern, supra note 22, at 338 n.81.
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Dagan omits the rationale too quickly. Maybe it is missing from
stable market economies, but Czechs, among others, have chosen
this as their focus for restitution. Natural restitution sends a
message: not of the vindication of personhood through protection
of property, but nearly the opposite, that the communists could
gamble with your land and then, when they lost, return it to you in
shambles. In the Czech Republic, the property returned is often
more of a liability than an asset, property the state willingly gives
back.75
By offering a percentage of the property's fair market value up
to a fixed ceiling, Hungary also adopts an ex post level of recovery
that reinforces the ex ante incentive to expropriate. Hungary's system is based on the rationale of well-being. It aims to restore the
original owner to some fixed percentage of her ex ante level of
wealth. While this is not precisely a valuation scheme that Dagan
considers, the remedy suggests to future expropriators that they
have little to fear from this method of restitution. Expropriators
have effectively been granted an entitlement to use the property,
while being called on to restitute only a fixed and minimal percentage of its actual value. The Hungarian system, however, includes
the following caveat: the fair market value of property valued at
less than $2,300 is restored in full. For smaller property, then,
Hungary's purportedly limited restitution is even stronger than
Czech natural restitution; in Hungary, people's well-being is fully
vindicated with respect to their smaller and perhaps more personal
assets. This is indeed a surprising result.
Viewed in Dagan's terms, the Czech and Hungarian transition
programs no longer seem to fall on opposite sides of the restitutionary spectrum. Both countries are enacting limited property protection that may reinforce the perverse incentive to expropriate. The
sharpest contrast in restitutionary approaches, then, is not between
natural and monetary restitution. 76 Rather, both programs stand
together in contradistinction to other programs, such as that enacted in the former East Germany, in which the government restores either the property itself or its current fair market value,

75. See Crowder, supra note 22, at 254. The property is not returned free and clear.
Already dilapidated buildings may have tenants who cannot be evicted and for whom basic
services must continue to be provided. "Protective rent controls place owners in a precarious
situation by not allowing rent increases to keep pace with maintenance costs." Id. at 256.
76. This, despite commentators' implicit assumptions to the contrary. See, e.g., Gelpem,
supra note 22, at 316 ("At the other end of the spectrum [from the Czech Republic], Hungary
has granted former owners near-nominal compensation in capital vouchers."); Youngblood,
supra note 71, at 645 ("[Restitutionary programs] range from no restitution to the return of
all property taken by the former government."); Banker & Offe, supra note 22, at 11-12.
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whichever the original owner prefers.77 Germany's "well-being and
control" remedy - also applied to the most protected resources in
American restitution law - removes ex ante incentives for future
expropriators to take property unjustly by restoring the greater of
fair market value and profits. The Czech Republic and Hungary
provide no such disincentive.
Dagan's approach has already provided a powerful and counterintuitive insight: rules valuing restitution may reveal normative positions even more clearly than do rules on the physical form of
recovery.
2. Eastern Europe and the "Personhood"of Property
What does the general decision to vindicate well-being or control tell us about underlying social values? Here, Dagan's framework is indeterminate but still useful. The Czech and Hungarian
laws may be able tell a story about their relationships with particular restituted resources, or they may equally well reflect each country's socioeconomic ethos.
Within the Czech Republic, restitution's political success was
tied to the personal significance of the resource at issue. For example, passage of the Small Restitution Law can be explained, in part,
because the law "returned small property of greater personal significance to a larger number of people than did the subsequent
laws."' 78 As Czech policy moved away from core resources, opposition increased. Even within a general framework of limited natural
restitution, the Czechs created a hierarchy similar to the one Dagan
reports in the American legal context. While the restitutionary
remedy does not vary across resources in the Czech Republic natural restitution is exclusively favored - differing political reactions to the various stages of restitution strengthen Dagan's claim
that the rules reflect a people's relationship to different resources.
Looking to the personhood quotient of a resource opens a new
way of perceiving Hungarian restitution. Instead of a mere economic necessity, Hungarians' sliding scale grants greater protection
to items of smaller economic value but perhaps more personal
meaning. By giving full fair market value for smaller losses, the
Hungarians vindicate the most acute interests people had, not in
great concentrations of wealth, but in ordinary things like the family apartment. Dagan's framework helps explain, and perhaps justify, Hungary's approach.
77. See Rainer Frank, Privatization in Eastern Germany: A Comprehensive Study, 27
VAi. J. TSANsNATL L. 809, 833 (1994). This principle is subject to several important exceptions that limit natural restitution. See id. at 833-38.
78. Gelpem, supra note 22, at 327.
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The Ethos of Expropriation

The personhood quotient of a resource is only one side of
Dagan's analytical coin. Flipping now to the other, each country's
social ethos may also make its respective restitutionary programs
more intelligible. The restitutionary rules reflect how people today
understand the legitimacy of the original expropriation. Countries
that judge the communists more harshly now may place more emphasis on higher restitutionary awards, to the extent they can afford
them. 7 9 Both the Czechs and the Hungarians suffered communist
rule and Soviet invasion, and today both go to considerable lengths
to distinguish themselves from their political predecessors.
A generation of communist rule could have plausibly affected
each country's sharing ethos - an ethos shift that may be reflected
in its restitutionary awards.8 0 Dagan does not explore this issue in
his case studies; rather, he takes the ethos as a given, an exogenous
rather than endogenous variable in restitution programs. Contrast,
for example, East Germany's socialist regime, "where small business presence was tolerated in manufacturing and service sectors,
[with] the Czechoslovakian Communist government [that] nationalized practically all business to the state or operated these business
in the form of cooperatives."' Did more intensive socialist rules
shift attitudes so that people became less invested in particular material resources?
The original Czech expropriation was on an enormous scale:
"since 1945, the Czech lands had undergone the largest-scale nationalization in the region." 82 Whether this reflected a preexisting
national view of sharing or marked a radical shift, communal ownership was ubiquitous by the time the communist regime fell. The
Czech's aggressive attack on private property perhaps created - or
did it reflect? - a willingness to permit forced transfers of resources. In turn, perhaps this willingness can begin to explain why
Czech restitution protects only well-being or control, while East
Germany protects well-being and control. In other words, the form
of restitution may teach us that Czechs had more tolerance for com79. See Gelpern, supra note 22, at 330 ("[T]he extent of compensation can be only as

great as the country's load-bearing capacity permits." (quoting speech by Imre Konya, parliamentary leader for the Hungarian Democratic Forum, PoliticalParties in Brief, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB

File)).
80. The communist government in Czechoslovakia engaged in systematic efforts to eradicate almost all forms of private ownership. For over 40 years, then, Czech citizens were
indoctrinated into communal ownership and the government's right to collectivize people's
land and expropriate their property. See Renzulli, supra note 22, at 170-74.
81. Neff, supra note 22, at 370.
82. Gelpern, supranote 22, at 324-25; see also Crowder, supra note 22, at 240 ("You can't
understand the scope of the challenge ... until you realize that here we don't own anything
other than our toothbrushes.").
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munist nationalization than did the Germans, whose restitution
programs reflect more complete rejection of communist nationalization. Or maybe East Germans just had richer patrons - Dagan's
theory is not really designed to help us distinguish these cases.
The cutoff dates for restitution may also give some insight into
national ethoses, beyond the symbolic myth-making role we have
already discussed.8 3 Immediately after World War II, the Soviets
expropriated land in East Germany that is not being restituted now.
This results partly from the deal the Soviets made when they left
Germany in 1989, but also from a sense of the legitimacy of the
initial Soviet actions punishing the Nazis and breaking up feudal
estates of the discredited Junker class. 84 Similarly, in the Czech
Republic, "[t]he intensity and breadth of opposition to the Czech
Restitution Law [with an earlier recovery date] is evidence of popular belief in the justice of these post-war expropriations, and the
persistent assumption of the collective guilt of Germans." 85 The
perceived legitimacy of the original expropriation affected the restitution debate.8 6 Dagan's approach focuses on a national ethos of
sharing versus individualism, but the postsocialist experience shows
that this variable is itself responsive to historical events.
More bluntly, people seem more sharing-oriented when their
government is sharing around a disfavored group's property. In
other words, when designing restitution laws people ask (and commentators should ponder): sharing with whom? It is not only the
quantum of personhood invested in a resource that matters, but
whose resource is at stake. Perhaps a restitution program reflects
the innocuous judgment that heirs and distant generations have less
personhood wrapped up in a piece of property than living and present citizens. More invidiously, the idea of sharing can be used to
exclude disfavored groups from claiming restitution.
Recognizing that sharing orientation depends in part on the social status of the original owner also explains limitations on who can
file restitutionary claims. Why exclude Czech citizens living
abroad? Why not permit foreigners to recover property? The simple answer is that the Czech Republic has come to view their
precommunist expropriations as relatively legitimate, by contrast
with Hungary, which has not.
83. See supra section III.C.2.
84. See Crowder, supra note 22, at 243; Stack, supra note 22, at 1221-22.
85. Gelpern, supra note 22, at 327-28.
86. See, e.g., Youngblood, supranote 71, at 646 (discussing Poland's proposed restitutionary plan which distinguishes between property taken by the Polish government and property
taken by the Communists, claiming that "the latter is merely a cost of war," and distinguishing between property taken pursuant to communist law and property taken outside the law.).
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We find ourselves surprised to describe the Czech Republic,
with its nationalistic, natural restitution approach, as perhaps more
sharing-oriented than Hungary with its limited cash vouchers. The
details of the programs, though, help qualify our understanding of
each national ethos. Compared with the Czechs, the Hungarians
evidence a relatively stronger individualist ethos by reaching back
to 1939 and they demonstrate a less nationalistic version of the
sharing ethos by restituting limited resources to a wide community.
The ethos of sharing, which seems to have a warm and fuzzy aspect
in Dagan's Talmudic story, reveals a nationalistic and exclusive undertone when run through the Eastern European example.
Thinking about the Czechs sent us back to our Talmudic sources
(rather, we cadged advice from those who know). Apparently, the
Talmud would not distinguish in Dagan's core example between the
Jewish and Gentile squatter; neither would owe restitution to the
landowner. Elsewhere, however, Talmudic law differentiates
sharply the obligations Jews owe to each other and to non-Jews. 87
The Talmud may require sharing within the group, but not with outsiders. In the Talmud, as in Eastern Europe, attitudes toward sharing turn out to be complex and contextual, dependent as much on
the definition of community as on the personhood of resources.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Dagan offers a useful new tool for thinking about comparative
law. Rather than losing ourselves in technicalities, an occupational
hazard that drives comparative scholars to abandon the field,
Dagan shows how we can extract the social values embedded in the
private law. Using his method, we can parse the core social values
hidden in any area of law. The technicalities of unjust enrichment
reveal compelling stories about property, personhood, and national
ethos. When put to a practical test, Dagan's approach opens a window on the frenzy of restitution across the former socialist world,
an issue of practical and political significance that has received
almost no theoretical attention. Dagan provides the intellectual
tools we need to start the job.
87. See, e.g., Steven D. Fraade, Navigating the Anomalous: Non-Jews at the Intersection of
Early RabbinicLaw and Narrative,in THE OTHER IN JEWISH THOUGHT AND HISTORY 145,
147-58 (Laurence J. Silberstein & Robert L. Cohn eds., 1994). For example, Fraade analyzes
a passage from the Mishnah which discusses the remedy for one ox goring another ox. If
both oxen belonged to Jews, the live one was to be sold and its profits divided between both
owners - a sharing rule. However, if a non-Jew's ox was gored, no compensation was due,
and if the ox of a non-Jew gored the ox of a Jew, full compensation had to be paid - a
damages rule imposed against outsiders. Id. at 147. Though Talmudic interpretations of obligations owed to non-Jews have evolved since medieval times, disparate treatment continues
to trouble interpreters. See generallyJACOB KATZ, EXCLUSrVENESS AND TOLERANCE (1961)
(examining the complex and reciprocal evolution of Jewish and Gentile attitudes toward each
other); DAVID NovAK, JEWIsH-CHRISTIAN DIALOruE 26 (1989) (emphasizing the Noahide

Laws which form "the rubric for the formulation of Jewish views of non-Jews").

